The Israeli invasion of Gaza continues, and despite President Biden’s recent peace proposals, a cessation in hostilities appears unlikely. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have proved their destructive capacity by reducing much of Gaza to rubble and killing over 36,000 Palestinians, the majority of whom are women and children. Israel is also under investigation by the International Court of Justice for the crime of genocide, and an International Criminal Court prosecutor has sought an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Hamas leaders, for war crimes.
The cost of this conflict has already become unbearably high for Palestinians, and the international community is beginning to lose patience with Israel’s campaign; popular protests are increasing, diplomatic pressure is growing, and the recognition of a Palestinian state looks all but inevitable.
Israel failing in Gaza; now eyeing Hezbollah in Lebanon
With such an enormous human and political cost, has Israel achieved its strategic goals? The brief answer is no, not at all. Before the horrific attack on 7 October, IDF commanders estimated that 30,000 Hamas fighters were based in Gaza; as of last month, the IDF estimates that they have killed 13,000 of these fighters, less than half of the estimated total combatants.
Hamas continues to post videos to their Telegram channels of snipers picking off IDF troops, small drones dropping grenades on vehicles, and close combat footage of anti-tank missiles and mines being used against Israeli Merkava tanks. Hamas even managed to launch a rocket attack on Tel Aviv last week from inside the Gaza Strip. Their fighting capabilities have not been degraded sufficiently to justify the enormous cost. The Israeli operation in Gaza has been an unmitigated disaster; a high death toll and excessive destruction do not spell strategic success – quite the opposite.
Despite this ongoing catastrophe, Prime Minister Netanyahu has announced ‘surprising plans’ for Lebanon, and Biden officials worry that Israel is planning a ground incursion across their northern border. Such a move would mean effectively declaring war on Hezbollah, Israel’s Lebanese adversary. Given the struggle to defeat Hamas in Gaza, would the IDF have more success in the north?
Who is Hezbollah?
Hezbollah was formed as a militia belonging to the Shi’ite sect of Islam during the bloody Lebanese Civil War. Since their inception, they have received funding, training, and arms from Iran, and as such behave as an Iranian proxy, with admittedly significant autonomy. The name translates as ‘Party of God’, and they are considered the largest non-state military power in the world.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Hezbollah has a total of 50,000 fighters, although in 2021 Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said the group had 100,000, almost certainly an exaggerated figure. It is considered a terrorist organisation by the UK, US, and the EU (only its military wing by the EU) due, in part, to its history of international terror attacks, such as bombings and assassinations, and present secretive international influence.
It is driven by its opposition to Israel. It has received a popular reputation as a resistance fighting force, due to its direct conflict with Israel over several decades, most notably during the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, and the 2006 invasion of Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah regularly exchange fire across the border, and over the past few months 60,000 Israelis and 90,000 Lebanese have evacuated from border areas due to increased fighting.
Their domestic support is arguably waning in the face of terrible Lebanese economic performance, but an Israeli incursion would likely shore up support for the group whose legitimacy is dependent on its reputation for resisting Israeli aggression.
How would fighting between Hezbollah and Israel take shape?
If Israel does decide to launch a limited ground invasion of southern Lebanon, it will face all the complications associated with offensive operations. Hezbollah will benefit from defending well-established dug-in positions. Southern Lebanon is replete with narrow roads, small villages and rocky terrain. These are terrible conditions for moving large armoured vehicles and excellent for guerilla fighters, both of which Israel is intimately familiar with from their failed and costly invasion in 2006.
The complex of tunnels and bunkers in the area has only improved since then. Hezbollah troops have also gained experience through fighting during the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Assad regime. Compared to many IDF troops, who have only had experience operating as an occupation police force, their experience may prove invaluable during combat.
Hezbollah’s vast rocket arsenal
It has been reported that militias, including Hezbollah, are being trained on using the Iranian-made Khordad-15 air defence system, although there is currently no evidence of their presence in southern Lebanon. As such, Hezbollah’s air defence appears limited to short-range man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and has limited capability against the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which proved highly effective in 2006. Israel will likely depend heavily on their Air Force to reduce the fighting capabilities of Hezbollah, but they will need to occupy border territory to remove the threat of short-range missiles completely.
Hezbollah’s stockpile of rockets and missiles is estimated to be anywhere between 120,000 to 200,000 strong. These vary in range and accuracy, but they would be sufficient to overwhelm Israeli air defences and cause significant destruction deep inside Israeli territory. Of course, Israel’s military capabilities far exceed that of Hezbollah, and the IAF can cause far more destruction to Lebanese infrastructure than vice versa. The question comes down to whether Israeli society is willing to shoulder the cost of a highly destructive war that will impact the lives of ordinary civilians.
Will the war happen?
Prime Minister Netanyahu and his alliance of far-right politicians, including Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich, seem determined to cling to power come what may. This is hardly surprising, given that Netanyahu faces domestic and international demands for his arrest, the former of which he remains immune to while Prime Minister.
One way in which this band of politicians may choose to remain in power is to trigger a wider regional war in which they hope to unite Israeli society against a common enemy. The war in Gaza has received widespread public support within Israel, but the government remains unpopular and has developed a reputation for military incompetence, something they may attempt to rectify by exacting a heavy toll on their northern enemy, Hezbollah.
Such a move would undoubtedly backfire. The IDF would be bogged down in the hills of southern Lebanon while taking heavy casualties against a well-equipped and experienced enemy. Israeli civilians would have to accept air raid sirens and bomb shelters as a feature of daily life. The cost of war between Israel and Hezbollah would be far too high for either government to survive.
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