Despite being proclaimed as a landmark election for the far right, the German election this week was nothing of the sort. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) underperformed expectations against a centre which stood firm and a revitalized left-wing.
German elections
A Martian, descending to earth the morning after the German elections this week, might have concluded that Elon Musk and Donald Trump, the former of which backed the AfD, had won the German election. The following day, the mainstream media in the UK led with much talk about a seismic shift towards the right. Nick Robinson on the BBC Today programme described the election as representing a “surge to the right” in German politics. The Guardian led its analysis of the election results with the headline; “Germany has swung to the right”. Of course, you-know-who was ecstatic at the result.
Reality paints a very different picture. Far from being a victory for the anti-immigration, anti-LGBTQ+, very anti-Green right-wing of German politics, this election was the opposite. The election results clearly show that the majority have rejected the far-right. The AfD have dramatically underperformed expectations and there is zero chance they will enter the German government in the CDU’s governing coalition. Equally, the much-vaunted swing to the right among people aged 18–24 failed to materialise. The AfD increased its vote share with 18–24 year olds, but were comfortably beaten by the Die Linke, the Left Party.
Far-Right underperformance – impotence of a unique kind?
We have a strange situation where the far right has underperformed and yet this underperformance is being vaunted as a great breakthrough, and dire warnings are being meted out to progressives about anything and everything. What exactly is going, and what conclusions can we draw from it?
Alternative für Deutschland’s underperformance fits into the global pattern of the far-right underperforming at election time.
In December 2023, the AfD hit a record high in polling when the party achieved 22.5%. Yet despite talk of a breakthrough, the AfD achieved 20.8% of the vote, a decline from their high in autumn/winter 2023. It’s important to remember the factors in the AfD’s favour. The AfD has several winds at their back: a greying population, anxiety over immigration, an SPD-led coalition which has endured an undistinguished period in government, and an unforgettable endorsement by Musk. But in light of the election result, and Germany’s continued guilt for the actions of previous generations of Germans, Musk’s actions may have hurt the AfD. It all builds up to a picture of the international right movement overplaying it’s hand.
With all these factors in their favour, the AfD still could not get more than 20%. This fits into a continent-wide trend of populist right parties struggling to pass a ‘ceiling’ of 20–30%. In 2024, Reform UK Party Ltd got almost the same number of votes as UKIP did 10 years ago. In other words, 20% of the electorate can be guaranteed to vote for the far right; but the far-right struggles to win more. Despite predictions of a breakthrough, the right keeps having to postpone the moment when it finally arrives.
Premature predictions
I have written previously for Yorkshire Bylines about the populist right’s underperformance electorally. Reporting the rise of the far right across Europe fairly means an accurate and unbiased assessment of what these far-right parties are achieving, and crucially, where they are falling short. Like a medieval settler hearing the first cuckoo of spring, many commentators are convinced that any poll predicting an electoral triumph for the far right is indicative that spring cannot be far behind. And yet the populist spring stubbornly refuses to arrive.
Let’s not forget the opinion polls, published in a lavish spread on the front of The Independent before the 2024 UK general election confidently predicting that Reform would overtake the Tories and Nigel Farage would be the leader of the opposition. In the end, Reform won five parliamentary seats. The same number as Plaid Cymru.
Lessons from Germany
So, what should we learn from the German elections? Firstly, that there is a significant body of opinion in Germany that does not want the AfD or its politics. Germany had a ‘normal’ European election. It is clear now, that there is in Germany, as there is elsewhere in Europe, roughly 20% of the electorate who can reliably vote for a populist right party. This is now the case across most of the western world. That does not mean that the rise of the right is a foregone conclusion.
People are desperate for inspiring, uplifting and inclusive leadership. It’s time for the Labour Party to pivot.
What next for Labour in tackling the UK far right?
So, what is to be done? The Labour Party seems to have drawn all the wrong lessons from the German elections. There is little evidence that a tough-on-immigration stance, alone, wins back voters from the far right. To counter the rise of the far right, Labour will have to exert some muscles it hasn’t exerted for several years, including upping its offer to the British people, and propose something grander and more ambitious than it has done in recent years. If despair should be found anywhere, it is in the current Labour Party’s absolute refusal to speak to any other voter demographics except for a small, handful in swing seats.
Psychologists have long noted a phenomenon. If people become convinced that catastrophe is about to befall them, they will, consciously or unconsciously, take steps to bring that situation about. If people are convinced that something bad will happen, they are more likely to unconsciously surrender. It’s easy to witness the rise of the far right across Europe and despair, but a sober examination of the facts reveals the picture is much more mixed. The right is far more divided, confused and institutionally incompetent than the headlines would presume. If the tidal wave of doomerism can be beaten back, the weakness in the right would be quickly exposed.
